if you run woodpecker-agent on windows and connect it to an docker
daemon, there could be two different platforms possible, as you can
switch from linux to windows mode and visa versa
---
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the cmd currently shows the full prompt and drop the exact error level.
this set the prompt to be hidden and let cmd exit with error level
reported by the command
---
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for normal posix shells we have to add the `-e ` option ... but as there
are more shells out there we have to handle this edgecases on base per
base case.
create a switch case statement in woodpecker should be fine as there is
only a finite number of shells, used in production.
also close #2612
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When in local mode, `getWorkflowIDFromStep` can handle normal steps with
a name like `wp_01h2a6qggwz68zekrkbwqq9rny_0_step_0`.
However, it will fail on clone (unless `skip_clone: true`) with an
`invalid step name` error.
```
invalid step name wp_01h2a2ebppp43bwjdfdsyj1m6m_0_clone
```
This patch handles either `_stage_` or `_clone` as the separator that
the local backend can use to extract the workflowID.
at the moment we compile a script that we can pipe in as single command
this is because of the constrains the docker backend gives us.
so we move it into the docker backend and eventually get rid of it altogether
/bin/env was used to resolve a command name against PATH and pass
additional environment variables.
All of this can also be achieved using functionality already provided by
go's exec lib, which will then internally pass the appropriate arguments
to e.g. execve.
A non-zero exit code signifies a pipeline failure, but is not a fatal error in the agent.
Since exec reports this as exec.ExitError, this has to be handled explicitly.
This also fixes logs not being shown on build errors.
Since /tmp is writable by everybody, a user could precreate
/tmp/woodpecker with 777 permissions, allowing them to modify the
pipeline while it is being run, or preventing the pipeline from running.
And since os.MkdirAll error code wasn't checked, the same attacker
could have precreated the directory where the pipeline is executed to
mess with the run, allowing code execution under the UID of the
agent (who has access to the toke, to communicate with the server, which
mean a attacker could inject a fake agent, steal credentials, etc)
