And only afterwards wait until a fragment was played. Otherwise we're keeping
our cache most of the time at "fragments-cache" fragments minus one.
Also allow setting "fragments-cache" to 1 now to start playback even faster.
nettle is used by newer versions of gnutls, while older versions of gnutls
used libgcrypt. Support both for now as not every distro has nettle yet.
nettle is preferred as it is more efficient to use and much smaller.
This patch fixes three memory leaks in hlsdemux, one that occurs
during normal operation and two that occur during error conditions.
The gst_hls_demux_get_next_fragment function calls
gst_fragment_get_buffer which increments the reference count
on the buffer but gst_hls_demux_get_next_fragment never calls unref on
the buffer. This means that the reference count for each downloaded
fragment never gets to zero and so its memory is never released.
This patch adds a call to gst_buffer_unref after the flags have been
updated on the buffer.
There is a leak-on-error in gst_hls_demux_decrypt_fragment if it fails
to download the key file. If the key fails to download, null is
returned without doing an unref on the encrypted fragment. The
semantics of gst_hls_demux_decrypt_fragment is that it takes ownership
of the encrypted fragment and releases it before returning.
There is a leak-on-error in gst_hls_src_buf_to_utf8_playlist in the
unlikely event that the gst_buffer_map fails. In the "happy path"
operation of gst_hls_src_buf_to_utf8_playlist the buffer gets an unref
before the function returns, therefore the error condition must do the
same.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=710881
On some live HLS streams, gst_hls_demux_switch_playlist causes
assertion failures because it tried to dereference a NULL fragment.
This is because g_queue_peek_tail sometimes was returning NULL and
this case was not being checked.
This patch does two things:
* move the g_queue_peek_tail inside the semaphore protection
* check if q_queue_peek_tail returns NULL
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=708849
Every encrypted fragment will be a multiple of 128 bits, the last byte
contains the number of bytes that were added as padding in the end
and should be removed.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=701673
