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e35d2af2e5
Changing the email address before any email address is activated should be subject to a different rate limit than the normal activation email resending. If there's only one rate limit for both, then if a newly signed up quickly discovers they gave a wrong email address, they'd have to wait three minutes to change it. With the two separate limits, they don't - but they'll have to wait three minutes before they can change the email address again. The downside of this setup is that a malicious actor can alternate between resending and changing the email address (to something like `user+$idx@domain`, delivered to the same inbox) to effectively halving the rate limit. I do not think there's a better solution, and this feels like such a small attack surface that I'd deem it acceptable. The way the code works after this change is that `ActivatePost` will now check the `MailChangeLimit_user` key rather than `MailResendLimit_user`, and if we're within the limit, it will set `MailChangedJustNow_user`. The `Activate` method - which sends the activation email, whether it is a normal resend, or one following an email change - will check `MailChangedJustNow_user`, and if it is set, it will check the rate limit against `MailChangedLimit_user`, otherwise against `MailResendLimit_user`, and then will delete the `MailChangedJustNow_user` key from the cache. Fixes #2040. Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu> |
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| .. | ||
| 2fa.go | ||
| auth.go | ||
| linkaccount.go | ||
| main_test.go | ||
| oauth.go | ||
| oauth_test.go | ||
| openid.go | ||
| password.go | ||
| webauthn.go | ||